DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

5185 Helen C. White Hall
600 North Park Street
Madison, WI 53706-1475

Tel: 608/ 263-3700
Internet: Philos@vms.macc.wisc.edu
Bitnet: Philos@wiscmacc
FAX NO: 608/ 265-3701

May 1, 1998

Prof. Yvonne Ozzello
Associate Dean of the Humanities Division
301 South Hall
CAMPUS

Dear Yvonne,

Please find attached a report summarizing the assessment of our Undergraduate Major Program. We intend to carry out the assessment of our Graduate Program during 1998-99.

I hope you will find it satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,

Berent Enç
Chair

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ASSESSMENT OF THE UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM
OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT
MAY 1998

I. Abstract

During 1997-98 our assessment activities concerning our Undergraduate Major in Philosophy focussed on evaluating how well the structure of our program meets the goals of the major in Philosophy. The goals are described in the "Procedures for Evaluating the Undergraduate Philosophy Major" reproduced in the appendix. Again, as described in that document, we adopted an approach that utilized both faculty and student inputs to the evaluation process. On the one hand, three faculty members assessed the upper level undergraduate majors for their level of mastery of the key concepts, methods, and skills. This assessment was conducted in each of the three courses that are required for the Major: Introduction to Logic (PHILOS 211), History of Ancient Philosophy (PHILOS 430), and History of Modern Philosophy (PHILOS 432). The instructors of these courses embedded questions in their tests designed to see how close we were getting to satisfying our goals. The individual reports submitted by the instructors, as well as the summary of this assessment provided in the report from our Undergraduate Planning Committee are attached. On the other hand, graduating Majors were asked to respond to a questionnaire designed to see how well they think we meet our goals. Again, a summary of the responses, as prepared by the Undergraduate Planning Committee is appended.

We find the results quite satisfactory. It is not surprising that some of our Majors find it hard to grasp theses like that of compatibilism or distinctions between <u>de re</u> and <u>de dicto</u>, especially given the fact that the majority of our Majors take these courses before they take other advanced courses. The fact that they are better than average in their performance on these tests is rewarding to see. It is especially important that the tutorial system used by both of the faculty members who routinely teach PHILOS 430 occurs at a relatively early stage of the typical student's career and thus introduces the student to key concepts and tools that are used later in advanced courses. The questionaires also reveal that most of the graduating Majors find taking these required courses prepared them for other upper level philosophy courses. It is gratifying to find that after going through our program a good majority of the students think that they have learned to deal with arguments more capably, and to write more articulately, and that they find the faculty accessible.

These results are only qualitative, but we thought that in a subject such as philosophy it would be pointless to use tools designed to gather quantifiable data.

All in all, our assessment reveals no serious flaws in our Undergraduate Major program, and we do not find any need to introduce any changes in the near future.

The third procedure we used was inconclusive. Two years ago, we noticed that some of our majors tended to take only one type of course or attach themselves to one or two faculty members

and take whatever courses <u>they</u> taught, and as a result they failed to acquire the expected breadth and depth in their distribution. We changed our requirements to rectify this problem. Now each student is required to take at least one course from each of two lists of core philosophy courses-- one list comprising topics devoted to value theory (theoretical ethics or social and political philosophy), and the other to metaphysics and epistemology. Since this change went into effect only recently, the pool of students who will have benefited from it is too small to allow us to see if it has succeeded in solving the targeted problem. We intend to return to this issue in two years' time. A report showing the result of the examination of the graduating majors' transcripts is also appended.

Respectfully submitted,

Berent Enç
Chair

Proceedures for Evaluating the Undergraduate Philosophy Major:

Goals:
    A major in philosophy can provide a core or principle around which a student can organize an education in the liberal arts. Accordingly the goal of the major in philosophy is (a) to provide a basic and balanced understanding of philosophical questions and the methods philosophers use in attempting to answer them, (b) and some appreciation of the history and the classic discipline, (c) to foster the development of skills essential for doing philosophy and for engaging conceptual issues generally; particularly, logical skills and ability to identify, reconstruct and critically assess arguments, (d) to prepare students for graduate study in philosophy, should they choose to continue to work in the field. Because many of our majors also major in other disciplines, we aim in addition (e) to provide opportunities through course work and independent study to investigate philosophical issues in the natural and social sciences, as well as in the arts and other humanities.

To these ends, we require majors to complete course work in:
    i. the history of philosophy, focusing particularly on the ancient Greek and Modern periods;
    ii. logic;
    iii. and in a variety of advanced subjects which are designated as satisfying our breadth requirement. Thus we require that majors who are especially interested, say, in the theory of knowledge also do course work in ethics or aesthetics, and that students interested mainly in political philosophy also study metaphysics and the philosophy of science.

Assessment of the Goals:

In order to assess our goals we propose the following:
(1) In the required courses, 211 (Logic), 430 (Ancient Philosophy) and 432 (Modern Philosophy— 17th and 18th Century Philosophy), a professor will assess the majors' grasp of key concepts or skills by embedding questions designed for this purpose in a regular examination or other assignment. This question might aim to test whether the student has a grasped some important concept (e.g., What is a valid argument form? the concept of "objectivity"? or Plato's Forms) or it might aim to test some key skill(e.g., the ability to recognize or produce a valid argument, to give a plausible rendition of some important argument, or to produce a criticism of an argument). The professor will then evaluate the performance of the majors and write a report for the Undergraduate Planning Committee. This is meant to assess whether we are meeting the goals stated in (a) and (b), and (c) above.

(2) The undergraduate planning committee will review the transcripts of the graduating majors to evaluate whether the advanced courses they are taking in

fact meet our goal of "breadth and depth" in the major. That is, are majors taking enough courses from a sufficient variety of areas as well as courses that are sufficiently central to the subject. This is meant to assess goals (a), (d), and (e).

(3) Questionnaires will be given to graduating majors to see how well they think we meet our goals. (This is meant to assess whether we meet all our goals) In order to assess goal (d), questionnaires will also be sent to students who went on to graduate school in philosophy (after their first year of graduate school) for the purpose of evaluating how well they think they were prepared by our program for graduate school.

Implementation of the Assessment of Goals:
We propose to do all of (1) through (3) next year (97-98) and, by the end of the Spring of 98, have the Undergraduate Planning Committee prepare a report for the department.
We think any changes we would make in the program would take at least 2 years to show up in any assessment. Consequently, after our initial assessment, we propose to do (1) through (3) every other year.

Report on Evaluation of Majors in Required Philosophy Courses

In accordance with our proposed assessment procedure, the professors in our 3 required courses - Logic (211), History of Ancient Philosophy (430) and History of Modern Philosophy (432) - designed a subset of questions on their exams to be illustrative of basic philosophical skills and understanding of important or characteristic philosophical issues. We then looked at how our majors in these courses performed on those questions.

In Logic (211), there were 4 majors, and 3 questions specially designed for the exam. In 11 of 12 cases, the work of the majors was above average, scoring overall in the AB/B range. The questions were particularly designed to test the students' ability to paraphrase sentences of English into quantifier logic, to understand the truth conditions of sentences in the language of quantifier logic, and to construct proofs in this logic.

In History of Modern Philosophy (430), there was one question selected from a tutorial assignment, in which students had to answer a series of questions putting together texts of Plato and Aristotle with philosophical understanding of the issues involved, which would allow them to both understand and to evaluate what is going on in these texts. The students then participate, two at a time, in a tutorial where they go over and are examined on their answers. The question selected was the first question, which set the philosophical background for the material under discussion:
(Q1) Explain the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity [see ch. 5 of course packet]. Make sure you explain the distinction in such a way that one can tell whether or not there can be de dicto necessities without de re necessities. It will be helpful to use clear examples in giving your explanations. You may find it useful to add a further paragraph using the example of the sea-battle.
This question addressed the students' ability to understand and present difficult philosophical material that they had read and discussed in class, and to do so in a way which indicated their ability to see the importance of this distinction for the surrounding discussion of issues in Aristotle's theory of substance and identity through time.
For the 15 philosophy majors, the results were:
A+ 2   B 6
A 2   BC 1
A- 2   D 1
AB 1
Particularly for the difficulty of the material, these are very good results, with grading that is not generous.

In History of Modern Philosophy (432), there were two questions put in an examination on John Locke:
(1) What is human liberty, according to Locke, and how can one hold that the truth of determinism is compatible with the existence of human liberty? And
(2) Explain what Locke means when he says that an idea is the 'immediate object' of the mind, when we think or perceive something. Why should we suppose that there is some such intermediate entity 'between' us and the things we see or facts we know?

These were designed to test the students' ability to (a) find answers to specific questions by looking at a text, (b) understand the views and definitions presented in the text (as well as their motivations) and (c) understand how these views addressed or raised particular philosophical questions, issues or positions. In some cases, the material had been explicitly discussed in class, in others not. The questions were worth 3 points; the average of the majors on (1) was 2.43, about AB, and on (2) was 2.2, a low AB or high B. Students showed good basic skills, but some difficulty in producing very clear, well organized presentations of arguments that they had not explicitly seen. It should be noted that majors often take this class before they have had much other rigorous philosophy.

Report on Work of Philosophy Majors in Elementary Logic

Among the basic of aims of Philosophy 211 (Elementary Logic) are the following:

a. to develop sensitivity to the logical structure of English sentences;
b. to gain competence in the analysis and construction of deductively valid arguments.

Modern propositional and quantifier logic are instruments of substantial value in pursuing these aims. On the twelve week examination, students are expected to be able to do the following:

1. paraphrase English sentences of moderate complexity into the language of quantifier logic;
2. demonstrate understanding of the conditions under which sentences of moderate complexity in the language of quantifier logic are true or false;
3. demonstrate the ability to construct deductively valid proofs in quantifier logic.

I compiled the results for the four philosophy majors in the class on these three questions. Their scores were:

	Q1	Q2	Q3
Student 1	10/20	22/25	20/33
Student 2	18/20	20/25	24/33
Student 3	16/20	22/25	33/33
Student 4	18/20	19/25	28/33

With the exception of the score of Student 1 on Question 1, these scores are above average in the course. The work of Students 2-4 on these questions is in the AB/B range, and the work of Student 1 in the low BC range.

Respectfully.
Michael Byrd

7

Evaluation of the performance of philosophy majors in The History of Modern Philosophy (432), Spring 1997-98 based on their responses to two questions on John Locke. Submitted by D. W. Stampe.

The History of Modern Philosophy (432) —Descartes to Kant—is a required course for the philosophy major. Among the 'aims' of the major are these: that the student acquire a knowledge of some major figures in the history of the subject, an ability to understand both the philosophical views of such figures, as presented in their own works, some implications of those views, and the main arguments advanced in support of them. In the present version of the History of Modern Philosophy course, all examinations (six of them) are sets of 'take-home' questions. (There is also a short expository essay required on Hume on causation.) Students are to extract part of the answers from the primary texts, here, Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, the rest of the information needed having been presented, quite explicitly, and discussed in lecture and/or in a set of class notes. The questions are graded on a point system: 0,1,2, or 3 points being possible (though 0 is given only for not attempting an answer). The entire exam is appended. This evaluation was done on questions 5 and 6.

> 5. What is *human liberty*, according to Locke, and how can one hold that the truth of *determinism* is compatible with the existence of human liberty?

Question 5 required the student (1) simply to *find and copy out* Locke's definition of liberty, "the power to do or forebear any particular act, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other"; (2) to *understand* that definition —in particular, to understand that it requires (x) that one be able to do the act if he should prefer to, and also be able not to do it if he should prefer not to do it; (3) to say what determinism is; (4) to have some sense of the apparent incompatibility of determinism with freedom; and (5) to explain how, on Locke's definition, one may argue that the two are actually compatible.

The average score on this question among majors was 2.43 points — between A and B, nearer AB than B. Students did well enough on (1) and (3), less well on (2); many failed to see that the definition requires (x), and that that's *all* it requires. This was evident in a common failure, among those who did poorly, to *apply* the definitions they had correctly reproduced in the rest of their discussion. Too often, the definitions having been dutifully reproduced, they went on their merry way untroubled by them This was compounded by a tendency to be distracted by Locke's remarks on the capacity to 'suspend the prosecution of any desire', which are only marginally relevant—this even among those who did well.) But compatibilism is difficult for students to get a handle on; Hobbes' plainer statement of it had been explained, and that helped a few.

I noticed that not one student in this class attempted to expound the logic of the issue— e.g. showing how the substitution of Locke's definition of freedom for another one would render an argument from determinism to the denial of freedom invalid. (I had run through the incompatibilist argument in lecture, but not recently.) This suggests some weakness on point (4).

8

6. Explain what Locke (and other proponents of the "theory of ideas") means when he says that an idea is the "immediate object" of the mind, when we think, or perceive, something. Why should we suppose that there is some such intermediate entity "between" us and the things we see or the facts we know?

Question 6 required the student to have absorbed the content of a recently given lecture which dealt with this topic, or else to be able to bring forward earlier discussions (e.g. of Descartes). The question tests whether the student could (1) explain a thesis of Locke's common to philosophers of this period as well as some 20th c. figures, without any particular passage of text to rely upon. And then, (2) whether the student could state one of the argument for that thesis.

The average score on this question among majors was just under 2.2 points, between A and B, but nearer B than AB. The general weakness was in some sloppiness and poor organization in explaining the view, and then (2) a tendency to beat about the bush before or instead of stating an argument with a discernible structure.

The relevant argument that had been offered in a recent lecture was an argument for postulating "immediate objects" to account for the similarities and differences among genuine perception and hallucinations or dreams. Many reproduced this well enough. What was more encouraging were the responses of several who, apparently from their own thinking, produced a similar argument from the distinction between veridical and (genuine but) erroneous perceptions; and others who argued quite nicely that the thesis of the unreality of secondary properties required that ideas be postulated as bearers of such qualities. This was a good application of related material, and a point which had not been made in lecture as a possible answer to this question. (Two students produced the standard argument from illusion —if it isn't the oar that is bent, there must be something else that is.)

Locke Homework ....

1. State Locke's argument purporting to show that there are no "innate ideas".

2. "Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it [i.e. the snow] produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number and motion of its solid parts?" How does Locke answer this question?

3. Why, according to Locke, is the property *e.g.* of being spherical really "in" the snowball, while the property of being white is not.?

4. *Whether man's will be free or not?* ""The question," Locke says, "is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's *will* be free as to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square". Why is it "improper"? (What *is* the proper question about freedom, according to Locke?)

5. What is *human liberty* according to Locke, and how can one hold that the truth of *determinism* is compatible with the existence of human liberty?

6. Explain what Locke (and other proponents of the "theory of ideas") means when he says that an idea is the "immediate object" of the mind, when we think, or perceive, something. Why should we suppose that there is some such intermediate entity "between" us and the things we see or the facts we know?

7. Comment critically on one of the above views of Locke's;
   or defend one of them against some common objection such as this one:
      re. 6. "This view makes knowledge impossible, because there is no way that I can know whether my ideas really resemble the things they represent to me, because I never perceive those things, I only perceive my ideas."

EVALUATION EXERCIZE FOR MAJORS: PHILOSOPHY 430: HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, SPRING SEMESTER 1998: Question 1 of Tutorial Assignment #1

I. Introductory Note & Explanation of the the background within the course against which the test question was asked.

Ia. TUTORIAL ASSIGNMENTS The question chosen for the exercize is one of four questions requiring written answers that were asked for the first of three "tutorial assignments". The aim of tutorial assignments as employed in this course is to have students produce written answers to difficult questions on certain absolutely crucial texts in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. For each tutorial assignment, the lecturer and TA attempt, during an average of four weeks of lectures and sections, to prepare students to undertake to explain and critically discuss these texts. Though *related* texts will have been discussed, these texts on which the questions are set *will not have been discussed in class*, prior to their producing the written assignments. The idea is that these assignments are to teach our students not just what leading scholars, or the lecturer, *think* is true about Plato and Aristotle, but to give them an idea of what it is like to work out *for themselves* what these crucial texts actually say, and to prepare them actually to disagree with received interpretations (whether those be the interpretations of the lectures, or opposing interpretations introduced by the lecturer, or opposing interpretations suggested by the students themselves) where such disagreements may be warranted.

After at least a week given the students to write their answers, they come, in pairs, to the lecturer (or TA: first to the one, then to the other, with the third one often being only with the lecturer) for one hour discussions during which their written answers are discussed, and their writing strategies and techniques discussed in detail..

1b. PREPARATION FOR TUTORIAL ASSIGNMENTS As already indicated, this consists of lectures on other central texts in Plato and Aristotle; but it also introduces the philosophical issues that it is likely Plato and Aristotle are grappling with--as well as discussing how those issues are addressed both in Plato and Aristotle and also within modern philosophy. The questions invite answers not only on what the point of a particular text might be, but also on crucial philosphical positions that are relevant to the texts that the students are being asked to analyze and criticize.

In the case of the present exercize, the preparatory lectures were on the problem of identity through change (how can you step into the same river twice, since the second time you step into "it", "it" will have changed and so no longer be the same, and so no longer be the same river?). In background lectures, two primary kinds of solutions were introduced, in connection with particular texts of Plato and Aristotle. First, there was Aristotle's use of the distinction between essence and accident (between essential and accidental attribute); with the consequent development of the theory of predicables and of the theory of categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, etc.); together with Aristotle's idea of postulating a systematic ambiguity (at least across categories) in such crucial notions as *is* (existence), *one, same* (identity), *other* (non-identity), *good* and so forth. There is no such thing, given this ambiguity, as "the same thing": only "the same substance", "the same quantity", "the same quality", and so forth. The idea was then developed that a substance can lose accidental attributes and still exist as the same substance, so long as it does not lose the essential attribute (say, *being a river, being a human*

being) that makes it the thing that it is (that is, that gives it its identity). Second, there was Plato's theory of Forms vs perceptibles (*being* vs *becoming*) as in the *Republic* and the modification of that theory in the theory of space in his *Timaeus*, in accordance with which there are not just *beings* (Forms: abstract structures of the sort *we* might say are discerned as interconnected in laws of nature) and *becomers* (perceptible things *in* space and time), but also a third kind of thing, space (or regions of space) which by instantiating these abstract structures ("imitating" or "partaking in" the Forms) actually produces the so-called becomers, and indeed even allow us to *explain away* these becomers. For example, on the first theory, it may still be Socrates even though he ceases to be pale by blushing, because it is still the same *human being*. (*Human Being* being taken, in this theory, as the essence of all human beings.) On the second theory, all we have is the abstract structure *human being* and the region of space that instantiates that abstract structure and to which we attach the *name* "Socrates". [We can of course choose also to attach that name to other regions of space spatiotemporally continuous with this region, but we can do the same for patches of color and attributes such as pallor. There is no good distinction here, of the sort Aristotle requires, between the real *things* (which can have identity through change) on the one hand, and attributes on the other. There is just *space*, which, by instantiation, has only accidental attributes, and the attributes (the Forms). Aristotle's *matter* is similarly an entity which is held to have only accidental attributes.]

Obviously we have in this contrast between Plato and Aristotle ways of asking what the basic entities in the universe are that are fundamentally at variance with each other--Aristotle's much more biological, much more concerned with ethics (the Aristotelian notions of responsibility and accountability for past actions, for example, requiring the notion of the identity of persons through change); Plato's much more idealizing and metaphysical and revisionist.

Besides these points, the lectures also discuss Aristotle's ideas of (a) logical analysis (in the *Categories, Topics,* and *Posterior Analytics*), (b) change (in Book I.5-9 of his *Physics*) (c) the four causes (and so of form, matter, and ends), and (d) potentiality vs actuality, all as ways of arriving at, or justifying, Aristotle's doctrine of substance and essence.

Ic. The Actual Assignment. So much for the background to the question. The actual questions in the present tutorial assignment address us to the crucial question in *Physics* II.1 (perhaps the most important single chapter in the whole of Aristotelian metaphysics) between natural objects and artifacts, and whether the form of something is its nature μᾶλλον ἤ ("more than" in one translation, "rather than" in another) the matter is its nature. The nature of a natural object being that in the object which gives it a direction of its own, must thus be that thing's essence. The entire set of questions is given as an appendix.

Id. The question selected from the tutorial assignment for purposes of the evaluation exercize. The first question of the first tutorial exercize was selected for the evaluation exercize. It runs as follows, together with some guidance on what sort of length student answers might ideally be. (On the question of length, however, students are encouraged to believe that it is more important that they *make clear what they think* than that they conform to length suggestions; so that if they think they need to write more than the suiggested length in order to to make the matter clear, they should do so.)

(Q1). Explain the distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* necessity [see ch. 5 of course packet].. Make sure you make the distinction in such a way that one can tell whether or not there can be *de dicto* necessities without *de re* necessities. <I wrote three short paragraphs on this, one on *de dicto* necessity, one on *de re* necessity, and one considering whether we should say that there is a *de re* necessity that I be human and mortal, or merely a *de dicto* necessity.> Note that it will be helpful to use clear examples in giving your explanations. You may find it useful to add a further paragraph using the example of the sea-battle.]

This distinction, which is crucial in modern discussions of modal logic, counterfactuals, and so forth, does not appear in Aristotle as such. However there is good reason to regard it as central to Aristotle's work, the (Aristotle'inspired medieval) distinction having been reintroduced into modern philosophy by the great philosopher-logician Jan Łukasiewicz, in the course of his discussion of determinism, and Aristotle's famous "sea-battle" discussion of fatalism in *De Interpretatione* 9. In the centuries preceding Łukasiewicz, and for four decades after Łukasiewicz, the notion of necessity was understood solely in terms of *de dicto* necessity (as in Hume's *constant conjunction*).

Ie. THINGS IT WOULD BE IDEAL FOR A UW MAJOR IN PHILOSOPHY TO BE ABLE TO SEE IN ANSWERING THIS QUESTION

(1). That a necessity *de dicto* (*dictum* = what is *said* = description, *dictum* arguably doing duty for "attribute") is a necessary connection between, say, pairs of attributes.

(2). That, as it is put in modern times, necessity is truth in all possible worlds, so that a *de dicto* necessity connects its pair of attributes in all possible worlds; and that the range of possible worlds in question depends upon the kind of possibility envisaged (logical, physical, chemical, legal, moral, linguistic ("analytic"). [It is assumed here, for the sake of argument, that there *are* alternative possible worlds, and there *are* necessities of the kind indicated.]

(3). That there can be such connections of attributes without there being any object that has any attribute necessarily (i.e., in all possible worlds). [But cf (9) below.]

(4). That a necessity that a particular thing have an attribute at a particular time is a necessity *de re* (*res* = thing)..

(5). That it is accordingly a fallacy to read the conclusion 5c of the following inference

> 5a. Necessarily (if anything is an unsupported body at a particular time, it falls at that time)
> 5b. This apple will be unsupported 2 seconds from now

so,

> 5c. Necessarily this apple will fall two seconds from now.

as yielding a necessity *de re*. At best the situation describes a necessity *de dicto* connecting the attribute *being an unsupported body* with the attribute *falling*. Even if the apple *does* fall in two seconds from now (because it is unsupported two seconds from now), it will not fall in all possible worlds.

(6). That essential attributes are attributes an individual must have *necessarily de re*--though the kind of necessity *de re* in question must be retrenched from, say, existence in all *physically* possible worlds, to existence merely in all physically possible worlds *in which the individual in question exists*. Otherwise, no human would ever have an essential attribute in the physically possible worlds, since there are physically possible worlds in which that individuals parents never

meet.

(7). That on the understanding in (6), an essential attribute attaches to a thing that has it with necessity *de re*.

(8). Accordingly, natures in Aristotle, being essences (essential attributes) must belong to individuals with necessity *de re*, it not making sense--except by way of an ellipsis--to speak of an attribute attaching to any *thing* merely in virtue of a necessity *de dicto*.

(9). That, given the accounts above of necessities *de dicto* and necessities *de re*, and assuming that attributes are not things, nothing would stop there being necessities *de dicto* without there being any necessities *de re*. [It could be that every supposed *thing* has its attributes accidentally, and all identity through change is merely relative to a choice of attribute. "Same human", "same bit of whiteness", "same virus culture" (used of what was first a human, then a corpse) and so forth. Not only is are regions of Plato's *space* like this, but also bits of Aristotle's *matter*.] On the other hand it might be argued on the other side--as Aristotle does--that since *things* are not identifiable unless they have essential attributes, there could *be* no things if there are no identitites of the sort generated by essential attributes. It would be a credit to a student to make either point.

(10). When Aristotle says (at the beginning of *Physics* II.1) that an artifact such as a bed does not have a nature *qua* bed, but does have a nature *qua* wood, and explains that remark by speaking of a patient (who happens also to be a doctor) being a healer not *qua* patient but *qua* doctor, he is, whether he realizes it or not, speaking in his illustration merely of *de dicto* necessity, whereas the notion of having a nature must be a necessity *de re*. Accordingly, *this* explanation of Aristotle's point about beds is inadequate to the more detailed account Aristotle gives later in *Physics* II.1, where it becomes clear that *being a bed* is just an accidental attribute of what people sleep on, and being *wood* is, if anything, the essential attribute in question.

(11). That Aristotle's sea-battle discussion of fatalism involves an interpretation of necessity that goes beyond those interpretations of "all possible worlds" given above in (2)--one we may call "inevitability from the present point of view", in which all individual past events are inevitable (necessary *de re*) while all connections of attributes in laws of nature are inevitable (necessary *de dicto*) whether past, present, or future, which leaves the situation that some events you might otherwise suppose possibilities in the future are ruled out while it is left open that there are *alternative* futures *not* ruled out either by these two kinds of necessities.

(12). That the *de re* necessities in the sea-battle are independent of *de re* necessities generated by the notion of essential attributes. Neither of these particular kinds of *de re* necessity are identifiable as *what de re necessity is*, that notion being more general than either.

Ie. What I looked for in my evaluation of the first question. Some of (1)-(12) above are relevant more to questions *building* on Q1, e.g., question Q3 rather than Q1 itself. And even those that are directly relevant to Q1 need not necessarily be appealed to by students in their answers to Q1. What is true, however, is that (1)-(12) indicate plenty of pitfalls into which the student might unawares plunge themselves if they do not have a good grasp of the distinction. (1)-(12) also give students plenty of opportunity to elaborate their answers in ways that show a deeper insight than one might otherwise expect. [In the tutorials proper, where I discuss their answers with them, I am able to ask them questions which will show whether or not they really do see the pitfalls and are able to evade them. The also enable me to see whether or not they grasp the deeper points that may be involved. The point of the tutorials is--having set them

questions to go at on their own, without their being able to produce rote answers--precisely to sharpen and firm up their understanding by confronting it both with difficulties in what they themselves say, and also with difficulties they may have overlooked, or at any rate did not confront. It is also to look for, and stimulate, deeper understanding of wider issues.] Accordingly, what I looked for was

> (α) a clear and "heads up" understanding of the basics of the distinction between necessity *de re* and necessity *de dicto* that avoided pitfalls; together with;
>
> (β) the use of clear examples to explain points;
>
> (γ) some understanding of the philosophical, historical, and and textual context that makes it important that one be clear on this distinction; and
>
> (δ) a little detail that showed their awareness of possible difficulties in the way of their answers.

It should be emphasized that the questions set are *very testing*, and that they would be testing even for graduate students who have taken a graduate seminar in Aristotle's metaphysics. I do not conceive it to be my job to teach University of Wisconsin philosophy majors stuff it would be easy to test them on for elementary knowledge of the kind some legislators think we should be teaching them (and apparently think we cannot be trusted to teach them). I conceive it to be my job to build on the considerable natural intellectual abilities of our students; to confront them with outstanding philosophical discussions of important philosophical questions; and to make them writers of clear and simple, yet philosophically discriminating English prose concerned with these questions. It should also be emphasized that the tutorial assignments do not constitute a mere testing of education gained, but are actually used as *part* of the educational process, the student's answers being a springboard from which to reach a deeper understanding as a result of the tutorial session. [I have supposed it to be beyond my mandate to seek some evaluator to interview students *after* the tutorial in order further to test what was gained in the part of the course covered by the learning experience of the tutorial itself. This evaluation is already enough of an intrusion on the educational process itself, in distracting the evaluator for work he should be doing for that educational process itself.]

II. THE EVALUATION PROPER

I examined the answer to Q1 of every major enrolled in the class who was designated a major in a printout for 2/6/98. Of these 17 students I requested that they hand me back their first tutorial assignments for purposes of this evaluation. 15 students did. The two who did not were, one of them, a bit better than average (**B+**), one worse than average (**BC**). The sample examined is thus virtually complete, and pretty well representative.

In my summary evaluations, I shall not be able to point out every place where one of (1)-(12) was involved in assessing what the student wrote. It should be clear, however, that usually several of these sorts of considerations may be involved even where I do not mention them. I have tried simply to give an over all characterization of each particular student's answer, which will convey the general flavor of how I evaluated the student's writing.

Explanation of student designations: 4th year students student #4.1 is the first of the fourth year students I evaluated, 3.2 the second of the third year students, and so on. It should be remembered, however, that some 3rd year students have had more philosophy courses than some 4th year students. (This is especially true of double majors, who may in their 4th year be doing most of their philosophy courses.)

<u>#4.1</u> thought de re necessity *was* what gave identity through change, thus missing on (12); but used very clear and convincing examples to explain the difference between *de dicto* necessity and the kind of necessity involved in having an essence. Showed awareness of the problem of retrenching in (6). Over all on **(α)-(δ): B.**

<u>#4.2</u> *seemed* to show a good over all grasp on the ideas behind the *de re-de dicto* distinction, but his/her uses of examples were not convincing, suggesting doubts as to his/her grasp on the distinction after all. Only later answers revealed that this was careless thinking out of the examples rather than serious misunderstanding of the distinction. Over all on **(α)-(δ): AB** in some respects, **BC** in other respects.

<u>#4.3</u> gave an excellent answer, full of pertinent and well-understood detail as per (1)-(7) and (11). A very promising bit of work, well borne out by his/her answers to the rest of the questions. Over all on **(α)-(δ): A+.**

<u>#4.4</u> wrote *very* briefly on this question. But it got across the material in (1)-(4) very clearly in very brief compass, and gave an excellent demonstration of the line of thought in (9) using the interpretation of analyticity for necessity (linguistic necessity), to show that we could have a universe in which no individual had any attribute necessarily. Over all on **(α)-(δ): AB+** in some respects, **A+** for argument on liguistic necessity.

<u>#4.5</u> seemed to give an account of *de dicto* necessity that made it merely linguistic necessity, but then tacked on (without offering an appropriate generalization) that laws of nature might also give us a kind of de dicto necessity. On the other hand, #4.5 explained the notion of essence, and the essential-accidental distinction quite well, and did a good job of explaining why it would be natural to suppose that linguistic necessity could never be *de re*. Summary: #4.5 understands quite well some of the issues involved in understanding things Aristotle says about essence, but does not have a more general grasp of the philosophical framework within which Aristotle's discussions are important. Also, I was not quite convinced that #4.5 really understood that Aristotelian essence was not a matter of *language*. Over all on **(α)-(δ): C** in some respects, **B+** in others.

<u>#4.6</u> had a good understanding of the importance of the essential-accidental distinction (which was well explained) to the notion of identity through change. In the further explanation of *de re vs de dicto*, however, #4.6 had a tendency to confuse an attribute's belonging to a thing accidentally with *de dicto* necessity. Over all on **(α)-(δ): B+** in some respects, **C** in others.

<u>#4.7</u> has not yet (I happen to know) taken logic (211) and his/her background is mainly in continental philosophy. #4.7's answers contained such philosophical solecisims as "A *de dicto* necessity is a necessity between attributes of the form if x then it is necessary that y.... A *de re* necessity is the necessity that some actually existing thing be what it is." On the other hand, #4.7 distinguished usefully (and apparently completely comprehendingly) between *de re* and *de dicto* readings of "It is necessary that you as a human being, are mortal". #4.7 also raised an

interesting issue about how the necessity of the past (Socrates born to particular parents) might possibly bear upon his having an essence. Over all on **(α)-(δ): C** on ability to express himself on this issue with the kind of clarity an analytical philosopher will insist on in his or her students; but a hint of **A-** in the subtlety of two of his points. (This same mixture of gaucheness in expression with genuine philosophical insight showed itself throughout this student's answers, but with the latter predominating in later answers which involved closer attention to the text.

#3.1 Gave an excellent account of the connection between the *de re-de dicto* distinction and the essential-accidental distinction, with nice clear examples, and explained very clearly the fallacy in (5), though *#3.1* did not offer a more general account of *de re* necessity as in (12). On the other hand he/she did describe the idea of inevitability in (11), and the way in which both *de re* and *de dicto* necessities are involved in that notion, rasiing also an interesting apparent difficulty in that notion. (We discussed that difficulty in the tutorial.) Over all on **(α)-(δ): A** in most respects, but a little disappointing in others (a touch of **B** in the failure to generalize, but a touch of **A+** also for raising an interesting difficulty of the sort that one will not see unless one is in considerable control of the subject-matter involved).

#3.2 explains very clearly how the having of an essence involves a *de re* necessity, as well as why past individual events might be construed as *de re* necessary; also explains very clearly why the idea of a law of nature involves necessity *de dicto*; and shows *quite* well, if not in an entirely satisfactory manner, the importance of avoiding the fallacy in (5). Over all on **(α)-(δ): A-.**

#3.3 explains quite clearly what she has in mind, has a good idea of what *de dicto* necessity is, but confuses a possible objection to a putative law of nature being *de dicto* necessary with an objection to the very idea of *de dicto* necessity; then switches to linguistic necessities as giving a better example of *de dicto* necessity. Yet *#3.3* also says that both the examples involved are genuine *de dicto* necessities. (We have someone here who is probably quite clear on the basic distinction, who nevertheless in raising an objection, mistakes what the objection is an objection against. This diagnosis was confirmed by discussion duriung the tutorial.) The rest of *#3.3*'s answer showed the same mixture of insight with confusions produced by the writing being really not quite clear and focused enough. The last paragraph attempted to answer the question of whether there could be *de dicto* necessities without *de re* necessities; but the example used to explain *#3.3*'s answer was quite inadequate to what *#3.3* was trying to say (hard to tell exactly what)--this paragraph being much more troubling than the earlier parts of the answer. Over all on **(α)-(δ): BC** for the quality of the exposition. Signs of distinct philosophical talent nonetheless (a touch of **AB**), signs that were much stronger in the rest of this student's paper.

#3.4 showed some understanding of necessity *de re*, but completely missed the boat on explaining necessity *de dicto*. In suggesting that Socrates' being human and mortal was an apparent *de re* necessity which might in fact be *de dicto*, *#3.4* exhibited a deep misunderstanding of something discussed in class (that there might be a *de dicto* necessary connection being being human and being mortal, even though there might also be a *de re* necessity with which Socrates is mortal). Over all on **(α)-(δ): F** on part, **C** on part. The rest of this student's paper was better, though also below par (**BC**). The TA did his best in the tutorial to clear up some of these confusions.

#3.5 gave a *very* philosophical and no frills answer, clear and simple, explaining very well *de dicto* and *de re*, essence and accident, and the case for an interpretation of necessity on which

past events are now necessary. Nice examples. Over all on (α)-(δ): **A**.

#3.6 gave a quite clear account of both *de re* and *de dicto*, as also of essential vs accidental--failing to point out, however, that the whole point of the latter distinction was to get one the notion of identity through change. Over all on (α)-(δ): **B**.

#3.7 explained with great detail and throughness an example of *de dicto* necessity involving linguistic necessity (analyticity) and showing how it would be plausible to suppose there could not be *de re* necessities on such an interpretation of necessity. #3.7 then went on to essence and individiual past events as each involving a *de re* necessity (though not making it quite clear that these two kinds of *de re* necessity will involve intepretations of necessity different both from each other and from analyticity). #3.7 then went on to explain in a very convincing way the fallacy in (5); and from there to arguing that there cannot be any such thing as *de re* necessity, on the basis that there is something illegitimate about the retrenchment described in (6)--which retrenchment was also very clearly expressed by the student. While the argument here was hardly conclusive, it showed enterprise, and the TA will have enjoyed trying to persuade the student out of his/her argument here. Finally #3.7 argued against the notion of inevitability in (12), taking a four-dimensional approach to spacetime. Once again, the writing was interesting, challenging, and enterprising. This is a very promising student. Over all on (α)-(δ): **A+**

#2.1 explained *de re* and *de dicto* along with accidental-essential, and the expression of these distinctions in terms of possible worlds and so forth with considerable clarity, using clear and convincing examples . #2.1 also dealt with the fallacy described in (5) very convincingly. #2.1. also very interestingly discussed the need for there to be *de re* necessities if a world is to be described using a thing-attribute methodology (where it is taken that attributes are not themselves things) using the discussion of a passage from the *Posterior Analytics* which was discussed in a pre-tutorial written assignment. #2.1 thought there might be an objection to this last supposed need in the necessity of past individual events (on Aristotle's conception of the past as necessary)--thinking that if Einsteinian relativity impugend the idea of an absolute past, that that would impugn this need. (As if showing the failure of the necessity of past individual events would undo the claim that essential attributes are had neceesarily *de re*). I tried to straighten out during the tutorial this confusion in an otherwise very interesting and pleasing answer. Over all on (α)-(δ): **A-**:.

Summary. The grades I gave out--not on some uniform scale, but on the basis of my own discriminations of strengths and weaknesses of the answers, as briefly indicated above--averaged out were

A+	2
A	1
A-	2
B	2

Then crudely assigning percentages to the mixed grades (BC/AB, C/F, A/B, C/A-, B+/C, B+/C, AB/A+, AB/BC) with more weight attached to the first one in the mix, that would be revised to

A+	2
A	2
A-	2
AB	1
B	6
BC	1
D or F	1

On the quality of the answers, I would say that some had an excellent grasp on most of what I might have expected them to have at the time of producing their written answers. Two were already at a stage where they did not need much help from the TA and myself. 5 more were at a point where they could probably be brought to a similar point as a result of discussing their answers with them. 6 more could be counted on as being brought to *some* reasonable understanding of *some* of the more important features of the distinction as a result of the tutorial discussion. Two were not yet up to scratch for purposes of really profiting from the tutorial. In their cases I was inclined to diagnose lack of application (whatever might have been the cause of *that*).

Taken as a whole group, the quality of the philosophical talent was very high. The quality of concentration and work put into the assignment, judging by philosophical quality achieved in writing and discussion was also very high. The quality of the actual writing was occasionally excellent; but much of it needed work as *philosophical* writing. (What is needed here is not writing labs staffed by people who specialize in English, but help from people who write *philosophy*.) But then writing well in philosophy is a lifetime enterprise. The tutorial sessions worked quite hard at improving this writing. The general enthusiasm for the subject (and for improving their writing) was both disarming and gratifying.

I would say the students I am teaching these days in this course are, if anything, more philosophically talented and hardworking than the students I taught in this course 25 years ago. They do not, however, write with even the discipline of students 25 years ago. Fortunately that discipline is something we can help these students acquire in our courses--many of our courses having just this emphasis on writing. (In the latter connection, cf also Professor Stampe's evaluation of Philosophy 432 for this semester.)

If the grades over all seem higher than grades were 40 years ago, several things should be remembered. First, students nowadays are allowed to drop course rather more freely and rather later in the semester than they were allowed to do 40 years ago. Second, there is less of an elitist reflex about these days amongst faculty to think that students are mostly of contemptible ability and achievement, and less of an inclination to write students off who do not say exactly what the

lecturer has been saying in class. Third, the majors in Philosophy at UW-MSN are, taken together, an unusually talented and ambitious lot. (For example 10 of the present 15 are double majors who are doing excellent work already in other subjects.)

III. APPENDIX: THE COMPLETE SET OF QUESTIONS

(Q1). Explain the distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* necessity [see ch. 5 of course packet].. Make sure you make the distinction in such a way that one can tell whether or not there can be *de dicto* necessities without *de re* necessities. <I wrote three short paragraphs on this, one on *de dicto* necessity, one on *de re* necessity, and one considering whether we should say that there is a *de re* necessity that I be human and mortal, or merely a *de dicto* necessity.> Note that it will be helpful to use clear examples in giving your explanations.You may find it useful to add a further paragraph using the example of the sea-battle.]
PREFACE to Q2.

In his discussion in *Physics* II.1 of humans, animals, plants, trees, and earth, air, fire, water as having natures, Aristotle gives the impression of supposing that they have natures *period.*: cf 192b9-16, by contrast with b27-8. But in his discussion of beds Aristotle can easily seem to be saying that there no such thing as *having a nature period*, but only the having of a nature in one respect and the not having it in another respect: Beds, he says, *don't* have a nature *qua* beds, though they do have a nature *qua* wood (192b16-23). Shouldn't we try to make Aristotle's position uniform here--either saying that (a) beds don't have a nature at all while humans do, or that (b) humans only have natures *qua* human, or *qua* flesh, bone, and blood, or *qua* earth, air, fire, and water, as beds only have a nature *qua* wood, or *qua* flesh, bone, and blood? (As it stands there is no contrast at all yet between beds and humans!) Before we are finished we will need to have figured this out. But before we turn to that, I think we will profit if we look at what follows this discussion. For what follows does not so much as use the word "qua". Perhaps this passage that follows will help us to understand what Aristotle is up to when he *is* using the "quas" locution.

At 193a9-30, Aristotle considers the case for saying that the nature and substance of the things that are by nature is "that which primarily inheres in each and which is in itself amorphous" [amorphous = without shape]. We see from what follows that this is supposed to be some sort of matter. What Aristotle does in this passage is to show how the idea that "the nature and substance" of anything is some sort of matter might be argued for. First there is (a) an argument attributed to Antiophon (a12-a17), and then (b) there is an argument (not necessarily Antiphon's: Aristotle does not say) which, under certain conditions, would extend Antiphon's argument to a further stage, which extended argument is then said by "some people" to have the consequence that (c) that Earth, Air, Fire, and Water are "the whole of substance", this most basic matter giving us the only things that have natures, they being the nature of all other things.

(Q2a) Explain the arguments described by Aristotle at *Physics* *II.1.193a9-30., consider how the pre-Socratics would have urged Aristotle to react to the question whether beds have no nature at all, or humans only have a nature in a certain respect--*qua* something (*qua* human or *qua* flesh, bone, and blood). (Do the pre-Socratics, as treated here, think that the bed is a thing with a nature? Or do they think the wood is a thing with a nature? Or what?)

Make sure that in your description of the argument that you bring out the kinds of criteria Aristotle seems to be attributing to Antiphon and the other thinkers involved [On what criteria are: the criterion for something, say for being a good president, is a standard we look to in deciding whether or not someone is a good president. For example, one criterion might be keeping uis out of foreign wars.] Make sure also that you indicate how much sympathy you would expect Aristotle to have for the *criteria* used by Antiphon and others (the criteria, not the ways they apply the criteria) for being the "nature and substance" of things (at a14-17, and esp. a24-28)?

Once you have explained the argument, explain exactly where you would expect Aristotle to object to what is said in the course of this argument (both the part Antiphon is reponsible for and the part that results from the extension of Antiphon's argument). (It is not enough just to tell me he rejects the ocnclusion. I want to know precisely where he objects *within* the argument.)

(Q2b) Presumably bricks, stones, and boards are themselves either made up of EAFW, or made up of materials which are themselves made up of EAFW, or, ... etc. Does that mean that certain bits of EAFW might have the potency of being buildable into a house? This is the question Aristotle asks at *Meta* V.7.1017b8-9. (i) What is Aristotle's answer to this question at *Meta* *IX.7.1048b37ff? <A few sentences only.> Can Aristotle's answer be defended against the charge of arbitrariness on what counts as a potency? (See *Meta* IX.1, esp.

1046a9-29, IX2, esp. 1046b15-24, and above all, IX 5, esp. 1048a5-16) (ii) Does this answer help us to see where Aristotle would object to the extended argument you were discussing in (Q2a)?

(Q2c) Returning now to Aristotle's treatment of what the natures are of things that are by nature, consider the case Aristotle makes concerning the case for saying it is the form more than the matter (or "rather than the matter") that gives us the nature. Make sure your answer makes clear your stand on the two questions (I) Do the arguments he gives here show that he thinks artifacts have natures after all? And (II) Do the arguments he gives here show that he thinks Antiphon is wrong that it is wood which has the nature in the case of this bed before us?

(Q2d) If we speak of bronze as the *proximate matter* of a statue, and earth, air, fire, water as the *primary matter* of a statue, which kind of matter is it that Aristotle says (in *Physics* *II.2.194a15-b14, *De Anima* *I.1.403a16ff, esp. a29-b12)' the physicist must have some knowledge? And which kind of matter is it of which Aristotle says, in the first passage, that it is of the class of relatives?

(Q3). Would Aristotle say that such things as have a nature have them by a necessity *de re*, or merely by a necessity *de dicto* (as it is necessary that a doctor be a healer only *de dicto*).

(Q4). At *Physics* *II.1.193a9-29, Aristotle gives the case for regarding earth, air, fire, and water as the natures of things. Explain that case, and indicate how strong you think Aristotle thinks the case is, indicating also how Aristotle would respond to the case (a30-b17). [Cf also *Meta* IX.2, 5, and *7, *De Anima* *I.1, *Physics* *II.2.194a7-b14.]

Respectfully submitted,

Terry Penner
Professor of Philosophy and Affiliate Professor of Classics

Please circle the correct answer or you can add some phrase or elaborate if you want.

1. Do you intend to go to graduate school in philosophy?
   Yes   No

2. Do you intend to go to graduate school in some other field or to professional school?
   Yes   No

3. Did you take 430 and/or 432 (Ancient and Modern) before you took most other advanced philosophy courses?
   Yes   No

4. If you took 430 and/or 432 before most other advanced courses, do you think you were more prepared for other advanced courses than if you had not taken 430/432?
   Yes   No

5. If you did not take 430 and/or 432 before most other advanced courses, do you think it would have helped you to have taken them before you took those courses?
   Yes   No

6. Did you go straight from taking introductory (100 level) courses to advanced courses (400 or 500 level)?
   Yes   No

7. In general, did you feel well prepared to take advanced level courses?
   Yes   No

8. Have your views about what Philosophy is changed since you entered the program?
   Yes   No

9. Did you select your classes based mainly on
   (a) topic   (b) professor   (c) time it was taught   (d) other

10. Did you read the comments on your papers and exams?
    (a) thoroughly   (b) somewhat   (c) not at all

11. Did you read the material that was assigned before the class in which it was to be discussed?
    (a) usually   (b) sometimes   (c) almost never

12. Do you think you learned more about the material you were studying when the class had written assignments and take home exams than when it had in-class exams.
    Yes   No

13. Do you think you learned more from a class that required :
    (a) several short papers   (b) a term paper?

22

14. Do you think that you have learned to recognize, construct, and criticize arguments in philosophy and elsewhere as a result of your philosophy major?

    Yes   Somewhat   No

15. Do you think that you are better at doing that (recognizing, constructing, and criticizing arguments) than students you know who have non-philosophy majors?

    Yes   Somewhat   No

16. Do you think that the process to writing philosophy papers has made you into an arciulate writer?

    Yes   Somewhat   No

17. Do you think most philosophy majors took the subject seriously.

    Yes   No

18. Did you find your professors willing to talk to you after class and in office hours.

    Yes   Mostly   Mostly not   No

19. If you thought your professors were willing to talk to you, did you take advantage of that?

    Yes   No   (If not, why not? Please specify)

20. Do you think the major should have more requirements?

    Yes   No

21. Do you think you have a well-rounded view of the different fields and issues in philosophy?

    Yes   No

22. If there are ways that you think the major can be improved or if there are specific problems that you had as a major please specify below.

A questionnaire was distributed to graduating majors. Altogether, there were 22 respondents. [Some did not answer every question, and a few provided more than one answer per question, so the numbers do not always add up to 22.]   Here is a summary of the results:

1) 5 respondents said that they intend to go to graduate school in philosophy; 16 said that they did not; and 1 said that he or she was unsure.

2) 10 respondents said that they intended to a professional school or to graduate school in some other field; 9 said that they did not.

3) 10 respondents said that they had taken our required history of philosophy courses before taking most other advanced courses; 12 said that they did not.

4) Of those who had taken the required history of philosophy courses first, 7 said that they found that they prepared them for the advanced courses they later took; 3 said that they did not.

5) Of those who did not take the required history of philosophy courses first, 9 said that they thought it would have been helpful to have done so; 3 said that they did not think it would have been helpful to have done so.

6) 14 respondents said that they went directly from 100 level (introductory) courses to 400 or 500 (upper level) courses; 8 said that they did not.

7) 18 respondents said that they felt "well prepared" to take advanced courses; 4 said that they did not.

8) 19 respondents said that their views about philosophy changed since they entered the program; 3 said that their views did not change.

9) 18 respondents said that they chose their courses mainly by topic; 2 by the professor; 2 by the time; and 1 checked "other."   [In this case, some checked more than one box and some checked no boxes. In fact, despite the "other" option, two students wrote in "none of the above."]

10) 20 respondents said that they read the comments on their papers and exams thoroughly; 2 said that they read comments "somewhat."

11) 11 respondents said that they read assigned materials before class "usually"; 10 said that they read the assignments "somewhat"; and 1 checked "almost never."

12) 17 respondents said that they learned more by doing written assignments and/or take-home exams than by in-class exams; 5 had the contrary view.

13) 18 respondents said that they learned more from a class that required several short papers and not a term paper; 4 thought the opposite.

14) 20 respondents reported that they think that they have learned "to recognize, construct and criticize arguments in philosophy and elsewhere" as a result of their work in philosophy; 2 thought that they did not.

15) 17 respondents thought that their ability to deal with arguments was better than that of students who had not had philosophy majors; 4 thought it was "somewhat" better; and 1 thought it no better at all.

16) 12 respondents said that the process of writing philosophy papers made them more articulate writers; 8 said that it made them "somewhat" more articulate; and 2 thought it did not make them more articulate.

17) 18 respondents said that they thought most philosophy majors take the subject seriously; 3 thought that they did not.

18) 15 respondents found their professors very willing to talk with them outside of class and in office hours; 7 found them somewhat willing.

19) Of those who found their professors willing or somewhat willing to talk to them, 17 said that they took advantage of that, 5 said that they did not.

20) 8 respondents thought that the major should have more requirements; 14 thought that it should not.

21) 16 respondents reported that they believe they have a well-rounded view of the different fields and issues in philosophy; 4 thought that they did not.

Students were then asked to write additional comments. No discernible pattern emerged: a few asked for more seminar style courses; some thought that professors' expectations should be made more clear at the outset of courses; some said that they were drawn to a philosophy major because of the lack of requirements; a few criticized the history of philosophy offerings; a few wanted courses in contemporary moral issues required of all majors; 1 wanted metaphysics required; a few asked for more discussion in courses; a few questioned the need for a logic requirement; one student found the new breadth requirement oppressive; etc.

Report on the Breath and Depth of the Advanced courses taken by graduating majors.

Several years ago, a review of the transcripts of our graduating majors revealed that majors were not making wise choices in choosing the advanced level courses that they took. Particularly, it was noted that too many majors (1) started taking courses on one topic from one professor and continued to take mainly courses either on that topic or from that professor, (2) took to many applied courses in philosophy and not enough theoretical courses, and (3) took special topics as opposed to survey courses of major areas of philosophy. We feared that, as a result of this, some of our majors did not know enough of the classic literature and issues in the majors fields of philosophy. Hence, we instituted a new requirement, requiring that the majors take one course from a selection of courses in Category A: Metaphysics and Epistemology and one course from a selection of courses in Category B: Value Theory. All of the courses in Category A and B are both theoretical philosophy courses (as opposed to applied courses) and survey courses (as opposed to special topic courses). We knew that making this a requirement would make there be more breath and depth in the courses that they took. But we also hoped that by being exposed to more professors and subjects they would make wiser choices about what other philosophy courses to take.

While we have been advising students to take courses from these categories for several years, the requirement to do so just went in effect this year for anyone declaring a major beginning the Fall of 1997. Very few of our senior majors declared their major that late, hence few fell under the requirement. Thus, at this point, we have far too small a sample to see if the requirement has had the one of the effects we hoped for--that the students would make wiser choices about what advanced courses to take. In fact, it will probably be several years before the people who fall under the requirement will be seniors and we can begin to have a sample large enough to evaluate the success of the requirement.

Just to see where we stand for future reference, what follows is an assessment of the number of students who took a course just from Category A, just from Category B, from both A and B, and from neither A or B. Also listed is a list of all the advanced courses and Category A and B courses taken by each graduating major.

Single majors:
    7/16 had no Category B course.
    1/16 had no Category A course.
    8/16 had both a Category A and a Category B course.
    0/16 had neither.
Thus, roughly half of these students had no Category B course, and half had had both a Category A and B course.

Double majors:
    5/25 had no Category B course.
    10/24 had no Category A course.
    8/24 had both a Category A and B course.
    3/24 had neither a Category A or B course.
Thus, 1/5 had no Category B course, 2/5 had no category A course, and roughly 1/3 had both a Category A and B course while 1/8 had neither a Category A or B course.

Of course, we know that once students come under the requirements they will have to take both a Category A and a Category B course. But the issue will be whether that requirement will be sufficient to correct the problems noted above with the choices they make in taking courses at the advanced level.

Single majors:

1.   501 545 440 550 454
2.   241 523 543 550 540 560
3.   511 551 455
4.   440,518 516 559 465 455 465
5.   241 441 520 559 517 549
6.   520 526 441 440 555 435 692
7.   253 454 551 439 520
8.   241 440 516 523 555 435 441 465
9.   520 241 555 511 557
10.   555 523 545 440
11.   512 511 581 NS) 911 560
12.   551 441 549
13.   512 511 517 551
14.   526 441 599 516
15.   241 526 440 433 465 955 465 916 465
16.   520 241 555 599 511

Double majors
17.   253 519 465 543
18.   441 524 555 559 681
19.   440 435 431
20.   440 511 516
21.   543 558 465 543 551 555 465
22.   241 581 557 581
23.   551 520 516 440 503 560
24.   553 516 555 558
25.   481 543 511 455
26.   599 516 557
27.   503 557 560
28.   557 582 955
29.   441 543 440
30.   440 551 543 560
31.   440 551 557 543 560
31.   241 501 441 543
33.   241 526 440 503
34.   557 440 465 453 455
35.   520 560 543 549
36.   241 511 520 551 264 522
37.   441 440 253 516 540
38.   241 441 518
39.   560 441 501 543 435
40.   241 441 511 557
41.   440 503
42.   555 543 558 599